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The Political Economy of Education
Research
CHAD LYKINS
University of Hong Kong
Government agencies and professional organizations have attempted to improve
education research by creating common standards for judging research quality.
However, the absence of agreement regarding research quality has limited the
effectiveness of this approach. This article argues that, rather than focusing on
standards, policy makers should leverage the market-like behaviors of those
engaged in education research by influencing the incentives that drive them.
Drawing on political philosophy and social theory, I argue that governments
should focus less on standards and protocols and more on reforming the processes
by which research capital is distributed.
Introduction
Recent efforts by government agencies and professional organizations to im-
prove education research have focused on creating common standards for
judging research quality. In the United States, the standards-based approach
has yielded numerous pieces of legislation, such as portions of the Reading
Excellence Act (REA 1999), No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB 2001), and
Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA 2002). It has also produced a series
of National Research Council (NRC) publications, including Scientific Research
in Education (NRC 2002), Strategic Education Research Partnership (NRC 2003), and
Advancing Scientific Research in Education (NRC 2004). Recently, the American
Education Research Association (AERA) has offered its own statements on
standards (AERA 2006, 2008, 2009). In the United Kingdom, a similar debate
continues to rage, centered initially on the publication of a series of reports
(Hargreaves 1996; Hillage et al. 1998; Reynolds 1998; Tooley 1998) aimed
at improving the standards for rigor and relevance in education research.
These efforts suggest that policy makers are increasingly concerned with
the governance and finance of education research. Federal agencies are seeking
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to regulate both how research is consumed (e.g., what counts as “scientific”
evidence of program effectiveness), as well as how research is produced in
federally sponsored research programs. However, their efforts to create en-
thusiasm for common scientific standards have been highly controversial. If
anything, divisions over the nature and purposes of education research are
now more pronounced than they were before the last 15 years of standard-
setting. One positive benefit of this is increased scholarly attention on what
education research is and what an education research community should
exemplify (see, e.g., Atkinson 2000; Biesta 2007; Clair and Belzer 2007; Cross-
ley 2008; the special issues of Educational Researcher 2002; or the several book-
length treatments of the subject, such as those by Baez and Boyles 2009; Hess
2008; and Johanningmeier and Richardson 2008). Several of these authors
are responding directly to federal reports and legislation, challenging them on
philosophical, scientific, and political grounds.
There seems to be a broad, though not universal, sense that the federal
government should focus its support on “rigorous” research. However, the
meaning of rigor is subject to “contestation and change” (Eisenhart and Towne
2003). Federal agencies tend to identify rigor with adherence to protocols or
standards. The authors of the influential NRC report, Scientific Research in
Education (NRC 2002), identify rigor with adherence to general principles.
Cannella and Lincoln (2004) argue for a more expansive definition of rigor that
would include “continued use of reflexive critical ethics, open and constant public
communication . . . the appreciation of and support for intellectual diversity . . .
contextual (sometimes even historical) knowledge, and critical actions” (305–6).
Though they work toward different conclusions, each of the above-mentioned
parties starts from the assumption that one can state a priori the characteristics
of good research. These characteristics (whether they are in compliance with
standards, or endorsement of principles, or political commitments to justice)
are then presented as something prior to and external from the actual process
of inquiry. It is either a checklist of methodological and design requirements,
as in legislation, or a checklist of epistemological, political, and ethical ori-
entations. What both approaches have in common is the conviction that we
can say at the outset, before inquiry has been conducted, what the conditions
of good inquiry are.
These approaches are threatened by the market-like behaviors of those en-
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gaged in education research. That is, they depend on the existence of a com-
munity of ethically upstanding individuals in order to succeed. However, it is
not clear that such a community is any more likely to emerge among education
researchers than among media corporations or automobile factories. The mar-
ket-like behaviors of individuals do not cease to exist once those individuals
become researchers. Thus, it should not be seen as surprising or anomalous
that researchers seek not just truth or the liberation of human beings from
suffering, but more banal goods like citations, grants, tenure, promotion, and
fame. What is needed is a model of research that can somehow leverage these
more banal pursuits into something that serves broader public ends.
This article gives such a model. It is modest in comparison to the above-
mentioned authors in that it does not purport to state the necessary and
sufficient conditions of rigor in education research. Instead, it attempts to shift
the debate from what rigorous research is to a debate over the political and
economic conditions that make rigorous research possible. While it does offer
an account of rigor in education research, this account is procedural rather
than substantive. That is, it claims that rigor is a characteristic of the process
by which research is produced and consumed, not the substantive ethical,
political, or epistemological assumptions that it makes. The key factor in this
process is the presence of criticism by diverse, self-interested rivals. Thus, the
marker of a good research community is not whether it stays true to standards
set down prior to inquiry but the extent to which it makes such criticism
central to its operations. However, the degree to which this kind of criticism
is present is, in part, a function of the economic and political environment in
which researchers find themselves. This means that governance of education
research can and should work from actual political and economic conditions,
rather than from an idealized vision of what their values and beliefs ought to
be or a vision of what protocols they ought to adopt.
Rather than turning to theories about research quality, the article turns to
research in political philosophy and social theory to outline the main features
of the political economy of education research and how they can be usefully
attended to by government. It argues that researchers exhibit market-like
behaviors, being influenced by various incentives that can, in turn, be ma-
nipulated by government interventions. Rather than coercing adherence to
external standards, government interventions should leverage the competing
interests of those engaged in education research. Drawing on the work of
Elizabeth Anderson and James Bohman on the conditions of democratic de-
liberation and of Pierre Bourdieu on the economics of scientific inquiry, it
argues that government should act to increase the incentives for researchers
to undergo critical engagement with those who have an interest in showing
the weaknesses of one’s own research. Critical engagement of this kind makes
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it possible to acknowledge deep social, political, or economic influences on
research while still carrying the possibility of transcending these idiosyncrasies.
Overview
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I argue that education
research can be seen as a form of political and economic activity by examining
the market-like behaviors of those engaged in education research. In the second
section, I show that, like other political and economic activities, both the
regulatory approach embodied in standards-based reform and laissez-faire
approach advocated by many critics can produce undesirable consequences.
In the third section, I argue that the source of these undesirable consequences
lies in the distinctiveness of the way capital is distributed in education research
and other criticism-based fields of economic activity when compared to other
fields of political and economic activity. I then argue that these consequences
can be avoided by acting so as to promote the unique economic character of
inquiry and minimizing the extent to which other forms of capital seeking
are profitable.
I. The Political Economy of Education Research
The Political Economy of Education Research
This article examines the role of government in the political economy of education
research, a term I use to refer to the people and institutions engaged in the
production, consumption, and exchange of education research. Since others
have used this term for somewhat different purposes (Clair and Belzer 2007;
Crossley 2008), I will take some space to clarify how exactly the term is used
in this article.
Education research.—The meaning and purpose of education research are
themselves matters of sustained debate (Eisenhart and Towne 2003; Johan-
ningmeier and Richardson 2008, 59–79). This article does not intend to take
sides. To the extent that it violates this intention, it takes the side of inclusiveness
rather than exclusiveness. The account it gives extends to “research” broadly
conceived so as to include the physical sciences, social sciences, humanities,
and arts. It includes activities such as reflection, speculation, observation,
analysis, argument, and synthesis (for a similarly broad definition, see Mor-
timore 2000).
The article takes the same inclusive approach to understanding the dis-
tinction between education research and other research. Education researchers
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borrow topics, questions, methods, and techniques from a wide range of dis-
ciplines, notably, economics, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, history, med-
icine, epidemiology, and studio art. Given this wide range of resources, it
seems that any distinction that focuses on a specific methodology or tradition
is unlikely to succeed. For the purpose of this article, “education research”
refers to inquiry into the various factors that influence and are influenced by
the creation of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, habits, values, abilities, and skills.
(This definition is admittedly broad, especially in that it makes no effort to
distinguish intentional vs. nonintentional creation. I think the distinction be-
tween the two is less clear than is assumed by others, such as Cremin [1976]
or Loewenberg Ball and Forzani [2007]).
Production.—Education research is produced by individuals, often in their
institutional roles within universities, schools, think tanks, private firms, non-
profits, popular media, as well as local, state, and federal agencies. Both the
processes and products associated with this production vary. The processes
may involve (for example) calculation, data collection, grant seeking, obser-
vation, reflection, and reading. These processes may yield a variety of products,
including blogs, books, documentaries, editorials, journal publications, mono-
graphs, presentations, reports, testimonies, as well as more imaginative goods.
Consumption.—These various research products are consumed by students,
parents, teachers, principals, administrators, politicians, bureaucrats, program
officers, and the producers themselves. For instance, students may make use
of research comparing universities when deciding where to pursue their degree.
Parents may use research on student outcomes to inform whether to send
their child to a public or private school. Principals have been found to use
research to inform a wide range of decisions (for positive examples, see Biddle
and Saha 2002; for less sanguine examples, see Spillane [2004]). Legislators
use research to inform and justify policy positions (for an interesting example
of the use of research to justify charter school policy, see Henig [2008]).
Producers may consume research so as to know the latest developments in
their fields. Different consumers may prefer different qualities in research
products—for instance, products that align with a certain disciplinary, political,
or ideological paradigm; research products that can be consumed quickly; or
research products that are narrowly or broadly focused. These preferences
may be influenced by a number of factors, some of which are discussed later.
Exchange.—Exchange refers to the process by which education research prod-
ucts reach education consumers. Others have argued that this exchange bears
sufficient similarities to other markets to warrant speaking of an “education
research market” (Clair and Belzer 2007; Crossley 2008). Some products reach
a large number of consumers, while others remain niche artifacts. Part of the
difference may lie in the inherent qualities of the research products. For instance,
a technical journal article may, due to its complexity, never directly reach a
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wide audience, while a succinct policy report on the same topic might have a
more diverse constituency. However, many factors that affect exchange are
extraneous. For instance, clearinghouses (such as the What Works Clearing-
house) and indexes (such as the Web of Science) may have a significant difference
in the volume of exchange for various research products.
Political economy.—By referring to the economy of education research, I mean
to draw attention to the means by which it is produced, consumed, and
exchanged. This economic activity is political insofar as it involves “the au-
thoritative allocation of values” (Easton 1965, 50). It affects the ways people
think of the aims and values of education, as well as the means for achieving
them. There is an indefinite number of possible research questions, as well as
an indefinite number of ways of going about answering them. Yet only some
attract the resources necessary to pursue them further. Inevitably, the questions
valued by some parties will attract greater attention, as will answers that tend
to benefit some rather than others. Thus, in addition to being an economic
activity, education research is an inherently political activity.
Capital.—The decision to produce, consume, or exchange education re-
search requires an investment of capital. The capital invested is not always
or even primarily financial. The investment may be in the form of social,
cultural, symbolic, or intellectual capital (see Bourdieu [1986, 1991], though
he would likely include “intellectual” capital as a subspecies of cultural capital).
Social capital can be roughly conceived of as the durable relationships an
agent has with other agents. These relationships can be used to acquire various
goods and to establish one’s status in a group. Cultural capital consists of the
various attitudes, beliefs, and manners that signify his or her social status.
Symbolic capital consists of the ways that others classify an agent (e.g., as
“lay” or “expert”). Intellectual capital refers to an agent’s cognitive and af-
fective resources.
Profit.—The primary incentive for making such an investment is the ex-
pectation of profit. Profit can be seen as the amount of capital returned to
the agent in excess of his or her investment. For instance, a university faculty
member may leverage her social capital to form a team of researchers. This
may allow her to create research products that yield higher rates of return
than if she were to work alone. The returns might come in the form of social
capital (deepened or widened social networks), symbolic capital (citations,
tenure, and promotion), or intellectual capital (skills and abilities). The ex-
pectation of profit may also influence her choice of which journals to read,
grants to seek, and students to mentor.
The notion that individuals seek profit requires two important clarifications.
The first is that they need not seek the highest profits possible. While classical
economics posits that agents seek maximum returns for minimal investments,
recent work suggests that they merely seek a reasonable or satisfactory return
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(Feuer 2006). The second clarification is that it does not matter whether one
sees the expectation of profit in the form of “doing good” or “doing well,”
that is, one’s effect on others or one’s own well-being. For instance, a person
may invest in research without the expectation of any private rewards, ex-
pecting some public benefit instead. However, the ability to do research that
contributes to the public good is dependent on the same economic maneu-
vering as the ability to do research that contributes to one’s private wealth.
In both cases, producers must learn which research projects are considered
“marketable,” that is, which projects are sufficiently in demand that the pro-
ducer can attract investors. This requires that the agent gains entry into a
competitive market and accumulates financial, social, cultural, symbolic, and
intellectual capital.
Competition.—As in other spheres of economic activity, agents in the edu-
cation research market compete against one another for scarce resources.
Success depends to some extent on the ability to outperform others through
the appropriation of relatively high returns for relatively low investments. In
a research economy, the returns for any given investment are determined by
those who consume the work. This enforces a unique form of market discipline.
This discipline occurs through the system of “crisscrossing checks and bal-
ances” from other producers and consumers of education research (Bourdieu
1991). In a well-functioning research economy, the profits sought by education
researchers—research grants, publications, tenure, and so forth—can only be
acquired by submitting their work to the criticism of well-armed, similarly
self-interested parties. These self-interested parties have a vested interest in
framing their rivals’ efforts as inadequate or incomplete. If they can dem-
onstrate that the research is significantly flawed, they can improve their own
position in a competitive market. If they cannot put forth such a public
demonstration, then the producer of the research product is able to appropriate
whatever capital is at stake.
This view of education researchers as economic agents may seem a bit
jarring or overly cynical. However, it has the following benefit over the “ha-
giographical” view of researchers as objective inquirers: it is compatible with
the more cheerful view of research without necessarily requiring it. That is,
even if humans are the power-hungry, self-interested scoundrels described by
Adam Smith and Michel Foucault, their self-interested power seeking can still
be used to produce research that transcends these limitations. Parochial loy-
alties to one’s class, party, or nationality are likely to be exposed by those with
loyalties to contending factions. On Bourdieu’s view, this is meant to explain
how exactly scientific inquiry—and, to a great extent, humanities and arts-
based inquiry—can achieve objectivity even if researchers themselves are in-
fluenced by values. But this objectivity is possible only when the acquisition
of capital is dependent on surviving public, free, generalized, and diverse
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criticism from self-interested rivals (Bourdieu 1991, 22). Regardless of whether
this yields “objectivity” in the strong sense, I offer as a hypothesis that it tends
to generate inquiry that is more rigorous and relevant than that which is
produced through some other economic processes.
The problem then is that researchers need not limit their profit seeking to
this sort of public competition. Like firms in other economic spheres, agents
can affect the perceived value of research products through practices such as
marketing and lobbying. These practices can work to undermine the role of
criticism as the sole conveyer of capital. If this happens, the various struggles
to gain market position among researchers lose the potential to transcend the
narrow interests of each party. The rigor and relevance of education research
depends on the extent to which the research economy distributes capital
according to critical versus noncritical competitions (Bourdieu 1991, 20).
Procedural constraints.—Education research, in addition to being a political
and economic activity, is a form of inquiry. As in other forms of inquiry, the
value of any given investment in education research is unclear in its beginning
stages and often no more transparent upon its completion. The difficulty in
assigning a value to education research confuses decisions as to appropriate
investments. For instance, a program officer at a grant-making agency may
be unable to forecast which topics, questions, and methods are most likely to
yield the highest returns on investment. Given this lack of information, agents
are more likely to seek a reasonable rate of return rather than an optimal
one. These cognitive limitations do not affect only education researchers but
all agents involved with education research—students, parents, teachers, ad-
ministrators, superintendents, program officers, politicians, as well as the in-
stitutions through which they function.
Goldhaber and Brewer (2008) describe how these procedural constraints
can be exploited by those seeking alternative methods of pursuing capital.
They hold that consumers “have little knowledge of what constitutes sound
research design,” but they often have a clear idea as to what they would prefer
for a study to conclude (199). This means that nuanced findings may have
no “natural constituency” (213). Researchers then have an incentive to pick
research approaches that will give results, “that fit a popular ideological per-
spective” (199). In addition, the ability to reach these consumers through
popular media increases the incentive to focus on publications that are meant
for popular consumption, rather than “the establishment of a scholarly track
record” (199). On their view, these perverse incentives have caused the market
to become flooded with research, allowing consumers to pick products that
serve their preconceived tastes (201).
Efficiency.—There are at least two ways of thinking about efficiency regarding
education research. The first considers the political economy of education
research as a whole, holding that efficiency occurs when additional investments
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in education research produce a less satisfactory return than investments in
some other market sector. For instance, assume that total investments in ed-
ucation research could be converted into dollars, currently equaling $100.00.
Now assume that an additional dollar spent on education research can be
expected to return only $.50, whereas an investment somewhere else (say,
medical research) can be expected to return $2.00. Under these circumstances,
additional investments in education research would produce less satisfactory
returns than additional investments in medical research.
The second way of thinking about efficiency concerns the distribution of
investments within education research, holding that efficiency occurs when a
change in the way investments are distributed within the education research
market would produce outcomes of equal or lesser satisfaction. To illustrate,
assume that there is $100.00 worth of capital invested across five kinds of
education research, labeled ER1, ER2, ER3, ER4, and ER5. It may be the
case that these different kinds of education research have different returns.
For instance, say that ER5 consists of using phrenological data (information
about the size and shape of the skull, widely gathered in the nineteenth century
but now understood to be politically and scientifically reproachable) to predict
gum-chewing activity among protestant fifth graders. Producers will likely see
that investments in ER5 are unlikely to yield satisfactory returns (public or
private), resulting in wasted financial, social, cultural, symbolic, and intellectual
capital. Any distribution of capital that allocates resources to ER5 will likely
be less efficient than one that does not.
However, such obvious cases are not typical. The choices are more often
between contenders with reasonable claims to legitimacy, such as between
grade levels, academic subjects, methods, outcomes, and so forth. If we propose
that supply and demand serves as the sole mechanism for distributing capital
among competing types of research, we might expect producers to be able to
form a plausible interpretation of their current market position and the relative
value of different investment strategies.
For instance, a doctoral student would understand the likely impact on her
chances of securing a job of writing a dissertation in philosophy of education
rather than secondary data analysis, or social studies rather than physical
sciences, or secondary rather than tertiary education, or any of the many
topics within these categories (i.e., she would know what is “hot”). In addition
to these categorical differences, she would understand the impact on her rates
of return of the quality of her work or, more precisely, how others perceive
the quality of her work. She would be interested in making sure her work is
perceived as being of high quality relative to her competition. If supply and
demand was to function as the sole mechanism for distributing capital among
researchers, we would expect producers to pursue research that is “hot” (i.e.,
relevant) and is perceived to have high quality (i.e., rigorous). In an efficient
Political Economy of Education Research
220 American Journal of Education
distribution, no category of research would stay too hot for long, for this excess
demand would soon be met with appropriate supply. Further, no category
would be especially burdened by research perceived to be of low quality, as
opportunistic newcomers would come to drive it out.
Market failures.—The market for education research can fail to be efficient
in at least three ways. The first is that agents may find alternative mechanisms
to open competition to generate returns for research products. This is made
possible because the value of any given research product is difficult to ascertain,
especially given that it must often be paid for in advance of its actual execution.
Rather than having the value of research products fixed through free and
open criticism by self-interested opponents, they may be able to disarm their
opponents through lobbying, marketing, or some other means. Thus, the
actual value of these products may be different than the value producers realize.
According to Goldhaber and Brewer (2008), the “public monopoly” of K–
12 education makes it easier for producers of education research to avoid crit-
icism from education consumers (214). Due to a lack of competition, there is
no form of market discipline to encourage consumers to “use research-tested
education strategies and to demand better research” (215). If this monopoly
was dissolved, education providers would have a greater incentive to distin-
guish research that is actually relevant to improving student outcomes.
Another way of avoiding competition is by controlling who enters the mar-
ket. If the “wrong” kinds of producers are granted entry, they can flood the
market and negatively affect the perceived value of research products. In a
well-functioning market, barriers to entry take the form of unrelenting criti-
cism. That is, each agent works to expose the ethical or epistemological flaws
of his or her opponents. This benefits consumers by improving the overall
quality of research products. However, in a dysfunctional market, producers
manipulate the value of their research projects by erecting extraneous barriers
to entry, ones that serve no purpose other than to shield them from the criticism
that might threaten their own market position.
The second way the market for education research can fail is if agents can
successfully divorce themselves from negative externalities associated with their
products. The collection of student data may be a worthwhile example. A
great deal of research requires students to suspend the activity of learning in
order to be assessed and to prepare to be assessed. The researcher may not
be responsible for any harms associated with the lost opportunity. Similarly,
the costs of failed intervention studies may be borne unevenly. A failed in-
tervention may have a highly positive rate of return for a researcher yet
extremely negative consequences for the subjects involved (this possibility is
what motivates the strident arguments against experimentation in education
by Baez and Boyles [2009]). More subtle examples of negative externalities
are also possible.
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The third way that the market for education research can fail is if an agent’s
private interests are misaligned with the public’s interests. For instance, agents
may experience higher returns conducting cross-sectional research than lon-
gitudinal research. The time and effort involved in longitudinal research may
jeopardize a producer’s chance of tenure and promotion. Further, consumers
may find that the results come in too late to serve their purposes (such as
demonstrating success on one’s campaign promises, or choosing a career).
However, there might be returns to such research that, though not captured
directly by the producer and consumer, are diffused throughout society. Such
justifications are often used to support public investment in essential public
services, such as security and transportation. They may also justify public
investment in education research.
This tension is made even more evident when traditions of academic free-
dom are pitted against public accountability. Johanningmeier and Richardson
(2008) find evidence that at least some education researchers directly respond
to shifts in federal priorities, apparently willing to trade self-direction in ex-
change for contract-based grant work. However, many are willing to sacrifice
the external funding necessary for expensive projects in exchange for the
preservation of their autonomy. According to Goldhaber and Brewer (2008),
the autonomy of academics means that much research may be “fragmented,
disparate, and parochial,” or focused on “narrow problems” (209). Further-
more, they claim that the dominance of education schools by qualitative
researchers leads to overproduction of “small, fragmented studies that focus
mainly on process, rather than on large, definitive studies that emphasize
outcomes” (209–10). In their view, producers should not have such a large
influence on what gets produced, as they are neither sufficiently “attuned to
the needs of the field” nor in possession of “high-quality standards.”
II. Three Approaches to the Education Research Market
At the most generic level, government interventions can manipulate the rates
of return for various investments in education research, thus changing the way
that agents perceive the alignment between certain decisions regarding research
and their own interests. For instance, assume the market does not on its own
generate sufficient incentives to engage research on a given topic. Producers
may lack incentive because there are few tenure track jobs available, few journals
that dedicate pages to the topic, and no grant-making agencies interested in it.
Consumers find that the financial and human resources needed to engage re-
search on the topic outweigh any reasonable expectation of benefits.
Let us continue to assume that such research—if it existed—may signifi-
cantly benefit the public. Such an instance might warrant government inter-
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vention. The government might create a national center for the study of the
topic, provide seed money for a journal, and subsidize the education of those
who are interested in research on the topic. It could also create a clearinghouse
of information so as to help consumers gain easier access to research on topics
of interest.
There are at least three possible government responses to market failures.
The first is the laissez-faire approach, which holds that though the market
may not be perfect, any government response will in the long run make it
even less perfect. The second is the standards-based approach, which holds
that the market can be improved by stimulating allegiance to a set of standards
issued by government or professional bodies. The third approach is the crit-
icism-driven approach, which holds that the market can be improved by
increasing the incentives to subject one’s inquiry to the well-armed criticism
of one’s rivals. In the following pages, I describe in more detail (1) what each
approach is, (2) the logic of how it works, and (3) the main reasons why it
may fail. I show that though all three approaches are imperfect, only the
criticism-driven approach allows for the possibility of self-correction.
The laissez-faire approach would seek to maximize the free movement of
capital between and among producers and consumers of education research.
Under such a system, government subsidies for the production and con-
sumption of research would cease to exist. On a very strict interpretation,
government subsidies of education would also cease to exist, as they may
indirectly influence the supply and demand for research on education.
There are at least two separate defenses of a laissez-faire approach. The
first is a rather unique mix of Enlightenment faith in the freedom of inquiry
and skepticism of government. The general thrust of the argument is that
government acts are inherently coercive, and that coercive acts are inherently
bad. Any government act that influences how researchers organize their work
extends the scope of government’s control over our thoughts and hence our
identities (Baez and Boyles 2009). Thus, all government influence should be
avoided.
The logic behind the laissez-faire approach reproduces the general logic of
how criticism-driven markets ideally operate. This holds that the criticism of
self-interested rivals is the best mechanism for distributing capital. In the event
that this mechanism fails to generate satisfactory outcomes, such failure will
either be eventually corrected or merely tolerated. On this view, any attempt
to meet market failures with subsidies or regulations would inevitably create
more distortion than it solves.
However, the laissez-faire approach is enmeshed in a conceptual difficulty,
namely, the fact that a failure to act can itself be interpreted as an act (for a
vivid proof, see Unger [1996]). If the federal government completely disen-
gages from education research, it is likely that much longitudinal (international
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and comparative) and large-scale research would cease to be possible. By
removing the conditions for the possibility of such research, the government
can effectively limit the kinds of questions researchers are capable of inves-
tigating, such as the differences in pedagogy across districts, states, and coun-
tries, long-term trends in student achievement, the relationship between ed-
ucation and health, and so forth. Thus, the choice not to fund such research
can be seen as just as much an act of control as the choice to fund it.
In addition, there are many “back-door” ways in which government influ-
ences education research. National, state, and local governments subsidize the
production and consumption of research in a number of ways, from the paying
of faculty salaries to the creation of research clearinghouses. Whether or not,
for instance, public schools exist is likely to influence the demand for research
on public schools. The presence or not of a large military is likely to influence
the demand for research on military aptitude. There are countless ways in
which government actions in other areas influence the demand and supply
for information about education. Thus, the laissez-faire approach is concep-
tually incompatible with our understanding of modern government.
Let us assume that the research market will, with greater or lesser frequency,
fail from time to time. The question is whether government interventions tend
to correct or exacerbate such failures. I focus on one particular intervention
strategy—setting standards and then subsidizing research that meets those
standards.
The logic behind the standards-based approach is as follows: First, the
qualities that are to be desired in research are determined a priori. Second,
standards are aligned with these qualities. Third, incentives are created to
produce or consume research that aligns with these standards. If successful,
research activity that has the qualities that are desired will be increased. Fur-
ther, the utility gained from this increase will outweigh the utility lost due to
opportunity costs and from the absence of criticism from those who are ex-
cluded as a result of not meeting the standard.
This can be done in part by concentrating capital on agents whose durable
dispositions align with the federal government’s understanding of relevance
and rigor. This capital can be leveraged into research that produces highly
visible publications. Barbara Schneider (2009) argues that publications are the
“currency” of academia, being the means of acquiring “prestige, recognition,
and access to research funding” (83). She extends the arguments of Robert
Merton (1968) and Arthur Diamond (1986) on the connection between ci-
tations and the ability to win tenure, promotion, and influence. These victories
can be additive, giving researchers “cumulative advantage” (Merton 1988).
Thus, by concentrating capital on researchers whose dispositions are aligned
with government standards, government can begin a process that may per-
petuate itself long after the initial investment.
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Producers and policy makers often argue that some group is not consuming
enough education research or enough of the right kinds of education research.
By converting the products of agents who are aligned with federal interests
into a form that is more marketable to influential consumers, the federal
government can increase the rates of return to the agent producing the re-
search. This both increases the profitably of such research and lowers the costs
of consuming it. The conferring of publicity onto certain research projects
also confers capital to those who produce them. This capital can then be
reinvested into additional research that can further strengthen one’s position
relative to his or her competitors.
An alternate strategy is to attempt to partially shut down the production
of research that does not serve federal priorities. For instance, the federal
government can make it impossible for states to purchase curricula without
also purchasing (for instance) a randomized control trial to demonstrate their
effectiveness. This can virtually shut down the production of large-scale eval-
uations that use alternative methodologies.
The standards-based approach can fail in at least two ways. First, it can
fail if it overcorrects and diverts resources from more productive kinds of
inquiry. This overcorrection can generate the academic equivalent of a “bub-
ble.” That is, the perceived value of certain research questions, topics, or
methods may be higher than the actual value, thus attracting an undeserved
level of investment. Second, it can fail if the absence of criticism from those
outside of the standard causes a decrease in quality that is more than the
increase gained by adherence to the standard. This can happen when re-
searchers are less focused on withstanding the criticism of others and more
focused on compliance.
Perhaps the greatest danger to the standards-based approach is that it nar-
rows the range of criticism by disarming research that is out of compliance
with established protocols. The result is that researchers who are in compliance
no longer have to face the critique of rivals whose own self-interest depends
on subjecting these products to intense scholarly scrutiny. The removal of this
pressure may “make researchers compliant rather than creative” (Mortimore
2002, 17). Rather than strengthening the incentives for high-quality research,
standards may unintentionally weaken them by making it easier to get by
without facing a full vetting by the research community.
This raises problems with the ways that standards limit access to the research
marketplace. The first is fairness. Standards put some individuals at the center
while pushing others to the periphery. Others have written at length about
how federal policy has altered the population involved in the production of
education research (Lagemann 2000; Travers 1983; Vinovskis 2009; Warren
1974). The marginalization of parts of the research community (as well as
other communities) from the production and consumption of knowledge is an
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ethical and political issue. For instance, the choice to concentrate subsidies
on research on topics of administration, finance, and organizational leadership
places policy makers and administrators at the center. It addresses the chal-
lenges and needs they must meet in order to do their jobs. Conversely, research
on behavioral management or curriculum design more directly address the
challenges that teachers face. A teacher may consume such research not just
as an idle curiosity, but as a way of improving his or her practice. Similarly,
research on the effects of school choice, tracking, and neighborhood and peer
effects may be more likely to draw parents into the research market, as it
addresses factors over which they may have some influence.
The ethical problem forks into two epistemological problems. If “relevance”
is part of what determines one’s estimation of the quality of a product, and
if one can expect one to determine that a product is relevant to the extent
that it meets one’s own needs, then one might expect that this judgment of
quality is highly dependent on who is doing the judging. Each act of exclusion
runs the risk of weakening the “unrelenting criticism” through which science
transcends idiosyncratic interests and gains a degree of objectivity. Attempts
to increase rigor and relevance that are predicated on concentrating capital
on a select breed of producers or consumers must provide some evidence that
this risk has been mitigated.
The standards-based approach seems likely to fail to satisfy any number of
theoretical requirements for a satisfactory account of inquiry. Three comple-
mentary frameworks relevant to this article are worth mentioning—those of
Pierre Bourdieu, Elizabeth Anderson, and James Bohman. Bourdieu’s notion
of open, unrelenting criticism is strikingly similar to recent work in social
epistemology and deliberate theory. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson (2006)
argues convincingly that no centralized body—whether it is a research agency
(such as IES) or a professional organization (such as AERA)—can effectively
distribute the resources necessary for knowledge production and consumption.
The problem lies in the basic fact that the relevant information is scattered
across a group of “epistemically diverse knowers” (Anderson 2006, 8). An-
derson argues that it is not simply diversity that produces better results, but
the open, inclusive, wide-ranging criticism that diversity makes possible. Thus,
inquiry into common problems is likely to be epistemologically stronger when
there are fewer barriers to participation. James Bohman (2006) similarly argues
that in matters of public concern, the rationality of centralized decisions is
“easily overwhelmed by deep conflicts and entrenched problems” (187). The
task of trying to keep false or unproductive opinions out of the debate is
unlikely to succeed. However, given sufficient openness and incentives for
deliberative engagement, false or unproductive opinions are more likely to be
exposed as such.
The criticism-driven approach seeks to encourage rather than restrain the
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characteristics unique to criticism-based markets. Namely, rather than equating
quality with what meets an antecedently articulated standard, it holds that
the best marker of quality is the ability to withstand the criticism of well-
armed rivals.
Aspects of the criticism-driven approach have already been described. There
are two main strategies, one negative and one positive. On the negative side,
the criticism-driven approach entails removing the extent to which research
capital is distributed on the basis of one’s success in marketing, lobbying,
compliance with standards, nepotism, or other noncritical activities. While the
negative strategy can remove some of the opportunities to win federal support
without facing extensive criticism, it is limited. There is little that governments
can do to regulate how publishers market their products or whether friendly
colleagues give each other favorable time slots at academic conferences. Fur-
ther, there is no sharp line between “marketing” and “dissemination.” In fact,
one might argue that researchers have a public duty to be more, rather than
less, active in pushing their products.
Thus, it is the positive strategy that must do the most work. This entails
increasing the incentives to pursue capital through the criticism of one’s rivals.
The gains to be had by this process must be significant enough to shift some
portion of an agent’s investments away from other activities and toward these
critical activities. Tenure committees might do this by giving significant weight
to the applicant’s success in having her or his research published in peer-
reviewed journals, as well as inviting other rivals to appraise her or his work.
The shortcomings of current ways of engaging potential and actual critics
are well known. For instance, the process of peer review is doubly vulnerable
to corruption. First, authors can exploit the fragmentation of the research
market to limit the range of potential critics. Many producers of education
research feel that there is a very small group of individuals who are competent
to assess the value of their own work. Further, many might hold that these
relations are not reciprocal. For instance, a researcher may feel competent to
judge the work of another researcher without feeling that that other researcher
can competently judge her own work. Second, those responsible for publishing
the work of authors are frequently accused of conservative bias, so much so
that Elliot Eisner (2002) has argued that peer review poses a grave threat to
creativity and innovation.
Prioritizing a criticism-driven approach need not entail rejecting standards.
The key question regarding the standards-driven versus criticism-driven ap-
proaches is in the logical priority—do we make the standards subject to crit-
icism, or criticism subject to standards? The main contention that this article
offers is that the latter approach is unsustainable and more open to degen-
eration. Thus, if a compatabilist position is what is to be desired, it must still
be one that places criticism as logically prior. The standards should emerge
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as temporary resting points that allow debate to continue on other topics.
Standards are the fruit rather than the root of scientific inquiry. They are the
product of scientific growth and contain the seeds for its continuation. Research
does not advance by adherence to standards; standards become more useful
by the advances in research.
The critical approach gives a more strenuous assessment of the quality of
research. Producers are subject not just to a checklist of standards but must
anticipate what others think, including those who think with a checklist. It is
thus likely that the critical approach captures all of the benefits of the standards
approach while providing incentives to do even better.
Conclusion
This article has given an account of rigor as a matter of the process by which
capital is distributed, rather than conformity to antecedent protocols or moral
positions. Rigorous research is that which answers the well-armed criticism
of self-interested rivals. This understanding of rigor is superior to others in
that (1) the norms that govern it are themselves improvable, rather than static;
(2) it is most likely to draw on the epistemic diversity of all those engaged in
research; and (3) it usefully directs the banal incentives that influence education
research toward public ends.
If researchers know that they will face widespread scrutiny, they may be
forced to think hard about the assumptions and commitments involved in
their work. This may also go a long way toward meeting the accusations of
a lack of relevance. Confronting self-interested criticism from people who find
their own research much more relevant forces researchers to more clearly
articulate and defend the significance of their work and to do so in a way
that is understandable and persuasive to those beyond their niche. Further-
more, it may do so in a more effective way than by giving “users” of education
research more direct control over the ways in which it is conducted (an ap-
proach usefully dissected by Gorard [2002]).
While the article argues for broad principles to guide the allocation of
resources, it does not offer any conclusions as to what this allocation will be.
As with research itself, this article focuses on the process rather than the results.
While this is the case, such a process is unlikely to support some sorts of
results—for instance, radical exclusion of marginalized voices. If such mar-
ginalization of individuals, and the subsequent degeneration of quality in the
research market, is to be prevented, those vested with the power to distribute
capital—such as higher degrees, grants, publications, presentations, students,
prestige, tenure, promotion, and panel membership—will need to place the
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sustained criticism of diverse, well-armed, self-interested rivals at the center
of their activity.
This may require a number of changes. Editorial boards, tenure and pro-
motion committees, and review panels may need to rebalance membership
between specialists and those from other areas. Specialists are required to
handle highly technical and nuanced claims—such as whether a historian’s
take on the origins of summer vacation includes all relevant sources, or whether
a psychologist is making use of the most sophisticated instruments available,
or whether a philosopher is providing a defensible interpretation of a given
thinker. However, the problem is that the people close enough to the area of
research to make such specialized judgments may lack the distance to make
more general, and perhaps more important, judgments. In addition, the self-
interest of fellow specialists may overlap too much with the self-interest of the
person being judged, creating a perverse incentive to give it a positive judg-
ment. Thus, rigor may require not only criticism from fellow specialists but
from those who enjoy a degree of intellectual distance.
This intellectual distance can have a number of dimensions. It can be people
who share the same area of research but draw on different disciplinary
traditions. It can be people who share the same disciplinary orientation but
apply it to different topics. In either case, the value of the topic and the
disciplinary approach are no longer simply assumed but become a possible
subject of inquiry. The composition of these panels and editorial boards is by
necessity imperfect—there is no panel large enough to represent every possible
viewpoint. But adding just one member may be a significant improvement.
The distance she or he brings may even help others rethink some of the
assumptions made by a proposal. The intellectual distance that separates ed-
ucation researchers from each other, often bemoaned as “fragmentation” or
“disjointedness,” might be a resource rather than an obstacle.
What holds for the review panels of journals also holds for the publications
that appear in journals. While there are a number of journals that have a
rather broad mission (such as American Journal of Education, Teachers College Record,
and the American Educational Research Journal), researchers frequently seek outlets
that have a far narrower audience. This article does not mean to imply that
specialist journals should not exist. But they must continue to demonstrate
the usefulness of the specialism to the broader community. Otherwise, they
devolve into scholasticism and irrelevance. For instance, it may not be enough
that a given article advances our understanding of what John Dewey really
meant in a given essay. One needs to also show that this is something worth
understanding. For a journal focused on measurement, it is not enough to
show that a given article advances the precision of some measurement, but
how this precision may actually help with a problem that other people inter-
ested in education might find compelling. Specialist journals should be a venue
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for specialists to engage the world and to have a voice, not enclaves where
they can retreat from broader scrutiny or social problems.
Academic conferences are another key venue for exchanging research for
social, cultural, and political capital. Hence, the extent to which this capital
is distributed on the basis of criticism is worthy of attention. The larger con-
ferences, such as those of the American Education Research Association, are
double edged. The proliferation of divisions, sections, and special interest
groups allows for focused discussion on carefully delimited questions. However,
even these groups could benefit by integrating those who have different in-
terests and thus perhaps some degree of distance. The amount of distance
desired might vary. The Paulo Freire special interest group may not need to
go so far as inviting researchers who study performance pay (not that this
would be a total waste of effort). They might benefit just by bringing in ed-
ucational philosophers working in different traditions. Small steps may be sig-
nificant, allowing researchers’ voices to reach a broader audience, rather than
remaining sealed off behind the closed doors of cramped conference rooms.
Doctoral education, some of which is subsidized by the federal government,
gives another opportunity for reform. Federal funds for many doctoral pro-
grams have been tied to the training of researchers who are committed to
research that uses randomized control field trials. On the one hand, these
grants recognize how few current researchers there are who are capable of
managing field experiments. However, it is not at all clear that field experi-
ments can form the sole basis of a productive career. Such training programs
may need to be more broadly focused, making sure that students defend not
just the integrity of their research designs but the integrity of their conceptual
and theoretical frameworks, and understand the place of their work in relation
to other methodological approaches.
An important question remains unanswered: What private incentives are
there for researchers to reform the current system so as to place criticism at
the center of the process of distribution? Do the reforms suggested in this
article depend on selfless agents, or can they function even if the research
economy is dominated by self-interests? While the public may benefit from
reforms that give criticism a central role in the distribution of capital, it is less
obvious that individual researchers will see comparable private benefits. Those
who fare well in the current setup, in which debate is limited to a very narrow
range of like-minded peers, may be reluctant to change.
The answer depends to a large extent on the confidence researchers have
in their own work. They may suspect that their work would fail to earn
approval from those outside of their niche. If so, then a criticism-driven re-
search economy looms as a threat to their private well-being. However, those
who feel that they can communicate the relevance and rigor of their work to
a broader audience may be drawn in by the incredible potential of the crit-
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icism-driven research economy. Getting one’s work in the hands of a broader
audience might help one cultivate expanded professional networks and achieve
greater impact both in scholarly literature and in the greater society. This in
turn can help one move to a more prestigious university, earn tenure and
promotion, and negotiate a higher salary. Thus, a reformed research economy
may be good not just for society at large but for the researchers who make
it function.
This article has identified the main political and economic dimensions of
education research markets, the ways in which these markets can function or
fail, and the ways in which governments can respond. The main argument
is that the best research policies will place criticism at the center of the research
market, perhaps by way of some of the suggestions mentioned above. These
suggestions are tentative, as should be any suggestion about the policy im-
plications of political philosophy or social theory, all the more so when the
topic is as vexing as education. The criticism-based approach is unlikely to
solve any problems in their entirety, but it may do a better job of managing
them than its main rivals. Given the severity of the charges against education
research, it is hard to imagine that the research economy would not be im-
proved if we came to expect researchers to be responsive to a much wider
range of conceptual, theoretical, and empirical criticism.
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